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I. INTRODUCTION
[S]hould the melancholy case arise that the judges should give
their opinions to the jury against one of these fundamental [con-
stitutional] principles, is a juror obliged to give his verdict gen-
erally, according to this direction, or even to find the fact spe-
cially, and submit the law to the court? Every man, of any feel-
ing or conscience, will answer, no. It is not only his right, but
his duty, in that case, to find the verdict according to his own
best understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in direct
opposition to the direction of the court.'
* Jon P. McClanahan, Judicial Clerk for the Honorable Roger L. Gregory, United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; Adjunct Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law.
I thank Richard Myers for his invaluable advice and mentoring throughout the preparation of this
Article.
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To a reader who is untrained in American legal history, the above pas-
sage might seem like it advocates a radical departure from the American legal
system as it has existed throughout history. Indeed, one of the basic tenets of
the modem jury system is that issues of law are reserved for the court, while
issues of fact are to be determined by the jury;2 that there should be jury review
of the constitutionality of laws seems an almost unthinkable proposition today.
Yet, this passage was taken from the diary of John Adams and was written in
1771. 3 What happened to the Founders' conception of a powerful jury, poised
to decide not only questions of fact but also questions of law, and when called
on, to resist enforcing laws that they deemed to be unconstitutional?
The early American legal system was strongly influenced by its British
ancestry. Not only did the American legal system often directly adopt Britain's
substantive law and procedures,4 but it also developed its own legal constructs
in response to what many colonists believed was oppressive British control.5 In
particular, the trial of John Peter Zenger became a rallying cry for the Revolu-
6tion. Zenger, who was charged with seditious libel for publishing statements
that were critical of British rule, was ultimately acquitted by a colonial jury,
despite the fact that the jury was only to determine whether Zenger had pub-
lished the statements and not whether the statements themselves were seditious.7
In response to the colonial juries' increasing refusal to convict colonists of
crimes committed against the Crown, Britain eliminated the right to jury trials in
particular categories of cases or declared that the trials be conducted in England,
thus denying colonists the right to trial by a jury of their peers.8 Given the Brit-
ish interference with the colonial judicial system, it is no surprise that the Decla-
2 JOHN ADAms, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
WITH A LwE OF THE AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 254-55 (1850).
2 James B. Thayer, "Law and Fact" in Jury Trials, 4 HARv. L. REv. 147, 147 (1890) (discuss-
ing the dichotomy between matters of law and fact). It is interesting to note that even though this
Article was written in 1890, it adheres to this strict division of labor between the judge and jury,
and dismisses any notion that the jury should decide questions of law not in accordance with the
court's direction. See id. at 170.
3 See 2 ADAMS, supra note 1, at 254-55.
4 See ROSCOE POUND, CRIPMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 77-116 (1930) (describing the devel-
opment of British criminal law and its impact on the American colonies); Douglas G. Smith, The
Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377 (1996) (provid-
ing detailed comparisons between the British and American jury systems).
5 Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United
States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 871-75 (1994) [hereinafter Brief History] (describing the role of
the jury in resisting British control through refusal to convict colonists accused of crimes against
the Crown and the subsequent limiting of the types of cases that could be heard by a colonial
jury).
6 Andrew J. Parmenter, Note, Nullifying the Jury "The Judicial Oligarchy" Declares War on
Jury Nullification, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 383 (2007).
7 Id. at 383-84.
8 Brief History, supra note 5, at 875.
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ration of Independence included among its grievances against King George I
that he had "deprive[ed] us, in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury." 9
The right to a jury trial, particularly in the case of criminal matters, con-
tinued to be of central importance in the drafting of both the Constitution l and
the Bill of Rights." Furthermore, all twelve states that had adopted state consti-
tutions prior to the Constitutional Convention included a right to jury trial in
criminal matters as one of the rights granted to their citizens.' 2 Although the
Founders considered the right to a jury trial to be of the utmost importance to
American citizens, there was little guidance provided on how the right to jury
trial should be implemented; consequently, there was much variation among the
states in a litigant's right to a jury trial and the role of the jury in deciding
cases.' 3 Perhaps this omission was an intentional one, giving states the power to
implement the right to a jury trial in such a way that they deemed most appro-
priate.1 4 Yet, if the right to a jury trial is to be an effective one and not a mere
formalism, jurors must be given a minimum amount of power over deciding
particular types of cases.' 5 By examining the statements of the Founders and
their contemporaries around the time of the drafting of the Constitution, one can
begin to get a sense of the different functions that were to be carried out by the
jury, as a protector of the people against overreaching by the government,' 6 as a
participant in the democratic process, 17 and as a central figure in the administra-
9 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776); see also Brief History, supra
note 5, at 875 (suggesting the connection between the fight of the British and American colonists
over the role of jury and the inclusion of the deprivation of the right to trial by jury among the
grievances in the Declaration of Independence).
10 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or
Places as the Congress may by Law have directed."); see also Note, The Changing Role of the
Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 171 (1964) [hereinafter Changing Role] (indi-
cating colonial opposition to the Federal Constitution because of its failure to guarantee the right
to trial by jury in civil matters).
1 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 83 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR'S BILL OF
RIGHTS] ("Indeed, the entire debate at the Philadelphia convention over whether to add a Bill of
Rights was triggered when George Mason picked up on a casual comment from another delegate
that 'no provision was yet made for juries in Civil cases."' (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 587 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1937) (1787))); see also
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 233-35 (2005) [hereinafter AMAR'S AMERICA'S
CONsTrruTiON] (discussing the debate between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the fail-
ure to guarantee the right to jury trial for civil cases in the Constitution, prompting the swift pas-
sage of the Seventh Amendment).
12 Leonard W. Levy, Bill of Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONsTrruTION 258, 269
(Leonard W. Levy ed., 2d ed. 1987).
13 Smith, supra note 4, at 422.
14 See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
15 See Parmenter, supra note 6, at 384.
16 AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 83.
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tion of justice.' 8 The right of the jury to decide questions of both law and fact
comports with these goals, and indeed the jury's right to decide questions of law
in criminal cases was widely accepted around the country from the time of the
passage of the Constitution until the middle of the 1800s.19 In 1794, the United
States Supreme Court even acknowledged the power of juries to decide ques-
tions of law when it presided over the jury trial in Georgia v. Brailsford, explic-
itly including such language in its instructions to the jury.2°
While the jury's right to decide questions of law was commonly ac-
cepted at this time, the right to jury review was not so favorably looked upon by
the courts, when that right was explicitly considered at all.2' Nevertheless, some
courts did allow defense counsel to argue the unconstitutionality of a law to the
jury, confirming the view shared by some scholars that the jury was vested with
the right to refuse to follow a law if the law were deemed by the jury to be un-
constitutional.22 While this concept is often conflated with the modem notion of
jury nullification, this right of jury review should be considered as distinct from
jury nullification, since the right to jury review would enable jurors to refuse to
follow a law if they found the law to be unconstitutional, while the latter would
enable them to refuse to follow a law if they found the law or application of the
law to be unjust.23
With the passage of time, mounting opposition arose to the recognition
of a jury's right to decide issues of law.24 While this opposition was by no
means uniform across the country,25 the gradual denial of this right continued
until 1895, at which time the Supreme Court's decision in Sparfv. United States
effectively turned any hope for the right of the jury to decide issues of law into a
17 Id. at 94.
18 Id. at 96.
19 Robert D. Rucker, The Right to Ignore the Law: Constitutional Entitlement Versus Judicial
Interpretation, 33 VAL. U. L. REv. 449,453-54 (1999).
20 Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 1, 3 (1794) (instructing the jury on its right to decide
questions of law as well as fact, even though acknowledging a court's better position in deciding
the law); see also Smith, supra note 4, at 449 (describing the jury instructions in Brailsford).
21 See David A. Pepper, Nullifying History: Modem-Day Misuse of the Right to Decide the
Law, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 599, 626-27 (2000) (arguing that jury review was uniformly de-
nied by federal courts).
22 Gerard N. Magliocca, The Philosopher's Stone: Dualist Democracy and the Jury, 69 U.
COLO. L. REv. 175, 195-96 (1998).
23 AMAR'S BELL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 98 & n.64 (distinguishing between jury review
and jury nullification).
24 See Changing Role, supra note 10 (detailing the progressive denial of the jury's right to
decide issues of law in Massachusetts as an example of such changes throughout the country);
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 582 (1939) (describ-
ing the prevalence of the right of the jury to decide questions of law in the early 1800s and the
weakening of the right in various parts of the country).
25 See Smith, supra note 4, at 452 (indicating that as late as 1851, fifteen states acknowledged
the jury's right to decide issues of law by constitution, statute, or judicial decision).
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26dead letter. The great divide between judges deciding issues of law and juries
deciding issues of fact was complete, and scholars tried to reconcile inconsistent
precedent and statements to the contrary.27
This Article argues that the Founders' conception of a strong, independ-
ent jury necessarily included the right of the jury to decide issues of law and
fact, as well as the related right to refuse to apply laws it deemed to be unconsti-
tutional. During the course of the nineteenth century, the ideals of an active
jury, involved in the administration of justice, poised to defend against govern-
mental overreaching, was replaced with the conception of a passive jury that
was only asked to dutifully decide disputed issues of fact. Justifications given
by legal scholars for this shift in practice, while appealing facially, are premised
on an idea that this shift was an inevitable response to the social changes in the
nineteenth century,28 but fail to fully acknowledge that the shift in practice itself
might have contributed to the failure to achieve the Founders' ideals of the jury.
It is important to note at the outset that this Article is intended to be primarily
descriptive in nature, detailing the role of the jury from the colonial American
era until the end of the nineteenth century. This Article does not purport to ex-
plore the normative question of whether the modem jury should have these
roles, leaving this topic for a subsequent article. Nevertheless, if one believes
that the Founders' conception of the jury should influence its modem formula-
tion, this Article will help inform that discourse.
Part II of this Article briefly describes the evolution of the role of the
jury in Britain and its impact on the conception of the jury in colonial America,
focusing primarily on the right of the jury to decide issues of law. Moreover,
Part HI examines the tension between Britain and colonial America concerning
the administration of justice, and how this tension helped shape the Founders'
vision of the jury. Part Il of this Article examines the conception of the jury
around the time of the enactment of the Constitution and Bill of Rights through
statements of the Founding Fathers and other contemporaries, in order to de-
velop an understanding of the different ideological roles that were to be fulfilled
by an inclusion of the right to a jury trial. In addition, Part III will examine how
the jury's right to decide issues of law and jury review fit within this ideological
framework., Part IV of this Article traces the erosion of the jury's right to decide
issues of law during the nineteenth century. This Article concludes by exploring
26 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895). For a more detailed review of the
Sparf case and criticism of its legal conclusions, see generally Donald M. Middlebrooks, Reviving
Thomas Jefferson's Jury: Sparf and Hanson v. United States Reconsidered, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
353 (2004).
27 See, e.g., Thayer, supra note 2, at 170-72 (attempting to reconcile the language of Georgia
v. Brailsford with the division of labor between the judge and jury by providing limited exceptions
to the rule governing the division of labor). But see Howe, supra note 24, at 583-84 (suggesting
that Thayer's vision of the division of labor between judge and jury does not comport with the
actual practices in the 1800s).
28 See, e.g., Howe, supra note 24, at 614-16; Brief History, supra note 5, at 915-20; Pepper,
supra note 21, at 639-40; Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 408.
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proposed justifications for this erosion, but ultimately finds that such justifica-
tions are inconsistent with the Founders' conception of the jury.
EI. THE BRITISH INFLUENCE ON THE EARLY AMERICAN RIGHT TO TRIAL BY
JURY
This Part discusses the relationship between judges and juries in Britain,
and in particular the tight control that judges traditionally exercised over judicial
proceedings and jury verdicts. By the seventeenth century, British judges ex-
erted considerably less control over juries. While the legal system in colonial
America was influenced by the growing independence of juries in Britain, it
went even further in giving juries the power to decide issues of law, independent
from judges.
A. Historical Evolution of the Role of the Jury in Britain
A comprehensive treatment of the British jury system is beyond the
scope of this Article;29 consequently, this Article will focus on the right of the
British jury to decide issues of law, as well as the evolution of judicial control
over the jury in reaching verdicts. Traditionally, there was a sharp division be-
tween the judge deciding issues of law and the jury deciding issues of fact.
Moreover, the judge had coercive measures at his disposal to ensure that the
jury's verdict was consistent with his wishes. Over time, however, British
courts began to recognize the need for an independent jury, which through the
rendering of a general verdict could decide issues of law.3°
British common-law courts traditionally adhered to a distinct division of
labor between judges deciding issues of law and juries determining issues of
fact,31 similar to that found in modem-day American courts. According to the
words of the British legal scholar Sir Edward Coke, "The most usual triall of
matters of fact is by twelve such men; for ad quaestionemfacti non respondent
judices; and matters in law the judges ought to decide and discusse; for ad
quaestionem juris non respondent juratores."32 While Coke's statement accu-
rately described the general rule, there were exceptions, the most famous of
which appeared in the trials of John Lilburne.33 During his 1649 trial on charges
of treason for publishing anti-government pamphlets, Lilbume asked the court
29 For a detailed description of the British jury system, see generally Smith, supra note 4.
30 See id. at 416.
31 See Thayer, supra note 2, at 149.
32 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND, OR, A
COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 155b (18th ed. 1823).
33 See Steven M. Fernandes, Comment, Jury Nullification and Tort Reform in California:
Eviscerating the Power of the Civil Jury by Keeping Citizens Ignorant of the Law, 27 Sw. U. L.
REV. 99, 100-05 (1997).
[Vol. 111
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to allow him to address the jury on issues of both law and fact. 4 In response,
the judge stated, "Master Lilbume quietly express yourself, and you do well; the
jury are judges of matter of fact altogether, and Judge Coke says so: But I tell
you the opinion of the Court, they are not judges of matter of law."35 Although
he was formally denied the opportunity to argue issues of law to the jury, Lil-
bume continued to advocate his right to do so in his closing statement, and ulti-
mately he was found to be not guilty on the charge of treason.36 In 1653, Lil-
burne faced a second trial, and again he advocated the jury's role in deciding
issues of law.37 In this trial, Lilbume went further, "invok[ing] the jury as a
shield, adjuring them to reject 'void' law and to act on behalf of the people,
whose powers of delegation of authority to true representatives had been wrong-
fully usurped., 38 In its acquittal of Lilbume, the jury found that Lilbume was
"not guilty of any crime worthy of death., 39
A closer inspection of Lilburne's writings and statements during his tri-
als reveal that Lilbume was arguing for more than just a version of jury nullifi-
cation as it is conceived in modem legal scholarship; instead, he was advocating
for the jury to decide pure issues of law as a judge and even engage in a type of
jury review.4° In the 1649 trial, he advocated that the jury should be able to find
that the statute was "null and void under the true law of England.'"' Further-
more, in the 1653 trial, he argued that the jury should be able to assess whether
a recently enacted statute was not in accordance with "due process" because the
statute imposed sanctions that did not previously exist under the common law.42
Beyond modem notions of failing to apply an unjust law, Lilbume was advocat-
ing a juror role similar to that of a judge, vested with the right to decide purely
legal issues as well as the right to decide whether a statute was repugnant to
Britain's unwritten constitution.43
In the British courts, judicial control over the proceeding and the jury
was initially quite strong, with the judge taking an inquisitorial role in question-
ing the witnesses and "compel[ling] jurors to reconsider decisions with which he
did not agree."44 As time went on, direct methods of compelling jurors to re-
34 Id. at 100-0 1.
35 THOMAS ANDREw GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 173 (1985).
36 Id.; Pepper, supra note 21, at 611; see Parmenter, supra note 6, at 381.
37 Fernandes, supra note 33, at 102.
38 GREEN, supra note 35, at 197-98.
39 id. at 197.
40 See Pepper, supra note 21, at 611 (exploring what Lilburne meant when he stated that the
jury should decide issues of law). Unlike this Article, the author uses Lilburne's statements in the
context of jury nullification. See id.
41 GREEN, supra note 35, at 195.
42 Id. at 196.
43 Pepper, supra note 21, at 611.
44 Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth
Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 497, 505-06 (1990); see Smith, supra note 4, at 406-07.
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consider decisions were replaced with indirect, yet arguably equally coercive
measures. 45 Due to the fact that jurors were traditionally considered to be wit-
nesses by the British courts, jurors could be found guilty of perjury for reaching
a "false" verdict.46 Through the writ of attaint, the court would impanel a new
jury to review the verdict, and if the second jury found the verdict to be incor-
rect, "the members of the first jury were subject to imprisonment, forfeiture of
lands and chattels, and denial of credit to borrow money. 47
The coercive tactics of the judiciary towards the jury were limited as a
result of Bushell's Case, decided in 1670.48 Edward Bushell was a member of
the jury in the prosecution of Quakers William Penn and William Mead on
charges of preaching to an unlawful assembly and breach of the peace.49 After
twice refusing to follow the instructions of the court, which had instructed the
jury to return a guilty verdict on all charges, "[tihe judge admonished the jury,
threatening not to release them until they returned an acceptable verdict: 'you
shall be locked up, without meat, drink, fire, and tobacco ... we will have a
verdict, by the help of God, or you shall starve for it. ' ' 50 In fact, the judge de-
tained the jury for two days without food, water, and heat, yet the jury did not
waiver in its decision.51 As a result of the jury's refusal to return a guilty ver-
dict, the judge imposed a fine on the jurors and imprisoned those who refused to
pay the fine, including Bushell.52 Bushell filed a habeas corpus petition, and
Chief Justice Vaughan declared in Bushell's Case that judges could not fine or
imprison jurors for rendering a verdict with which the judge did not agree.53 It
is interesting to note that Vaughan's reasoning was not based on the idea that
the jury had the right to decide issues of law; in fact, the opinion stated that a
juror is obligated to follow the law laid down by the judge.54 Nevertheless, the
"case established the independence of the English jury and cemented its position
45 See Robert Wilson, Free Speech v. Trial by Jury: The Role of the Jury in the Application of
the Pickering Test, 18 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 389, 394-95 (2008).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 395; see also James B. Thayer, The Jury and Its Development: III, 5 HARV. L. REv.
357, 364 (1892) (describing the procedure for the writ of attaint in further detail).
48 Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670), available at http://www.constitution.org
/trials/bushell/bushell.htm.
49 Parmenter, supra note 6, at 381.
50 Id. (quoting Trial of Penn and Mead, in 6 COBBETr'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE
TRIALS 951, 963 (1810)).
51 Id.
52 Smith, supra note 4, at 408.
53 Id.; The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1408, 1417 (1997); Parmenter, supra note 6, at 382.
54 See Simon Stem, Note, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: Debating Ration-
ales for Jury Nullification After Bushell's Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815, 1815-16 (2002). But see
Parmenter, supra note 6, at 382 (finding that "Vaughan declared that the jury determines the law
in all matters decided by a general verdict.").
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as a guarantor of liberty in the face of state oppression. ' '55 Despite Vaughan's
language to the contrary, the case was soon viewed as generally supporting a
jury's right to decide both issues of law and fact.56
In addition to a few prominent cases where British courts considered the
right of the jury to decide issues of law and the related power of courts to coerce
jurors to issue particular verdicts, the very nature of a general verdict itself ar-
guably gave juries a "de facto power" to decide issues of law.57 Although Brit-
ish courts could minimize the effect of enabling juries to decide issues of law
through procedural devices such as the special pleading and the special ver-
dict,58 when such procedural devices were not employed, juries could effectively
decide issues of law through a general verdict. Moreover, after the decision in
Bushell's Case, such verdicts could be made without fear of retribution by the
court.5 9
While British juries clearly did not have a recognized right to decide is-
sues of law, by the seventeenth century they had gained more freedom to decide
cases in accordance with their own views of the law, independent from that of
judges.
B. Tension between Britain and Colonial America Regarding Administra-
tion of Justice
As the struggle between Britain and colonial America escalated in the
time leading up to the Revolution, colonial juries played a vital role in mounting
opposition to oppressive British control.60 Not only were colonial American
jurors free of the extreme coercive judicial tactics that were once practiced in
Britain due to the result in Bushell's Case, but the colonies accorded judges
even less control over jurors than did their British counterparts. 61 Among the
greater powers given to colonial juries, the courts allowed lawyers to argue the
validity of laws to juries.62 Colonial juries, equipped with this relatively un-
checked power to render general verdicts, refused to convict defendants accused
55 Smith, supra note 4, at 408; see also Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of
the American Jury, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 377, 384 (1999) (discussing the impact of Bushell's Case
on the independence of the jury and the jury's role as a defender against governmental abuses).
56 Stem, supra note 54, at 1816.
57 Smith, supra note 4, at 416 (emphasis added).
58 See William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall's Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REv. 893, 905-06 (1978) (describing some of the procedures
used in Britain that were not extensively used in the American colonies in the mid-eighteenth
century).
59 Smith, supra note 4, at 408.
60 Bradley J. Huestis, Jury Nullification: Calling for Candor from the Bench and Bar, 173
MiL. L. REv. 68, 74 (2002); see also Brief History, supra note 5, at 871.
61 See Smith, supra note 4, at 439-41.
62 Huestis, supra note 60, at 74.
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of violating British laws, in particular those involving seditious libel 63 and trade
restrictions. 64 As an example of the colonial jury's influence on the administra-
tion of justice, in 1768 John Hancock refused to allow British customs inspec-
tors aboard his ship, in clear violation of a statute requiring such access. 65 How-
ever, the attorney general thought it futile to prosecute the case because a colo-
nial jury would refuse to indict or convict Hancock.66 One of the governors of
Massachusetts lamented that "a trial by jury here is only trying one illicit trader
by his fellows, or at least by his well-wishers. ' 67
Undoubtedly, the most celebrated and influential case of a colonial jury
refusing to convict an accused despite the weight of evidence was that of John
Peter Zenger, a printer who was charged with seditious libel for criticizing the
governor of New York.68 Initially, the judge charged three separate grand juries
to indict Zenger for seditious libel, but all refused to do so; consequently, Zen-
ger was charged by information. 69 When Zenger's original lawyers objected to
the chief justice presiding over the trial on grounds of lack of independence
since his service was at the will of the Crown, the chief justice not only refused
to disqualify himself but also had the lawyers disbarred.70  Under the then-
prevailing rules governing seditious libel prosecutions, the jury was not to de-
termine whether a publication was libelous, for that was deemed a question of
law to be decided by the court. 1  Instead, the jury was only to determine
whether the defendant had published the materials that were the subject of the
charge.72 Furthermore, truth was not considered a defense to a libel prosecu-
63 See Brief History, supra note 5, at 874 ("Hundreds of defendants were convicted of [sedi-
tious libel] in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but there seem to have
been no more than a half-dozen prosecutions and only two convictions in America throughout the
colonial period.").
64 See Robert E. Korroch & Michael J. Davidson, Jury Nullification: A Call for Justice or an
Invitation to Anarchy?, 139 MIL. L. REV. 131, 134 (1993) (noting that colonial juries refused to
convict defendants for violating navigation acts that were created to ensure that trade flowed
through Britain).
65 Huestis, supra note 60, at 74-75.
66 Id. at 75.
67 STEPHEN BOTEIN, EARLY AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY 57 (1983) (quoting Governor Wil-
liam Shirley).
68 Brief History, supra note 5, at 871; Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal
Judges to Marshall and Comment on the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charg-
ing Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161, 164 (1988). For a more detailed account of the Zenger case, see
generally Famous American Trials, John Peter Zenger Trial 1735, http://www.law.umkc.edu
/faculty/projects/ftrials/zenger/zenger.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
69 Harrington, supra note 55, at 393.
70 Brief History, supra note 5, at 872.
71 Pepper, supra note 21, at 614.
72 Parmenter, supra note 6, at 383.
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tion.73 Andrew Hamilton, Zenger's attorney, conceded that Zenger had pub-
lished the materials in question, but he nevertheless maintained that the jury
should determine whether the materials were libelous; 74 central to Hamilton's
argument was that the jury had a right to determine the law.75 The chief justice
disagreed with Hamilton, and the following exchange ensued:
Chief Justice: "[T]he jury may find that Zenger printed and
published those papers, and leave it to the Court to judge
whether they are libelous; you know this is very common; it is
in the nature of a special verdict, where the jury leave the matter
of law to the Court."
Hamilton: "I know ... the jury may do so; but I do likewise
know they may do otherwise. I know they have the right beyond
all dispute to determine both the law and the fact, and where
they do not doubt of the law, they ought to do so .... [L]eaving
it to the judgment of the Court whether the words are libelous
or not in effect renders juries useless. ,76
Hamilton, citing Bushell's Case as precedent, posited that "it is very
plain that the jury are by law at liberty ... to find both the law and the fact in
our case." 77 Hamilton argued for more jury involvement to combat a "wide-
spread fear" that a judge's already vast powers were incompatible with a judge
also having the sole power to interpret laws.78 Although the judge did not agree
with Hamilton's contentions, he did allow the jurors to return a general verdict,
and Zenger was acquitted. 79 An account of the Zenger trial was widely pub-
lished throughout the colonies, and it "became the American primer on the role
and duties of jurors.' 80
The Zenger trial has often been cited by scholars as a prime example of
the colonial jury's resistance to unpopular prosecutions by the British-controlled
73 Pepper, supra note 21, at 614; see also Brief History, supra note 5, at 873 ("The well-
established rule was: The greater the truth, the greater the libel.").
74 Brief History, supra note 5, at 873.
75 Pepper, supra note 21, at 615.
76 Brief History, supra note 5, at 873 (quoting JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE
CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 78 (Stan-
ley Katz ed., 1963)) (alteration and emphasis in original).
77 JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER,
PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 92 (Stanley Katz ed., 2d ed. 1972); accord Huestis,
supra note 60, at 74.
78 Pepper, supra note 21, at 615.
79 Brief History, supra note 5, at 873.
8o Id. at 874.
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government, 81 and indeed it is such a case. Proponents of jury nullification have
relied upon the Zenger case as support for the practice in colonial times, and the
two have almost become synonymous with each other.82 Taking a closer look at
Hamilton's arguments, however, reveals that his arguments for the jury deciding
issues of law were broader than merely advocating the jury's right to refuse to
uphold an unjust law.83 In particular, he argued to the jury that the court had
misinterpreted the elements of libel in the common law by failing to allow the
truth of the publication as a defense to the claim, using prior precedent and leg-
islation in support of this contention. 4 Hamilton also made policy arguments to
the jury against the judge's interpretation of the elements of libel.85 Finally, he
called upon the jury to consider inherent legal rights accorded to colonial
Americans, stating that "[the] nature and the laws of our country have given us a
right-the liberty-both of exposing and opposing arbitrary power .. .by
speaking and writing truth., 86 Taken together, Hamilton's arguments to the jury
were similar to that which would be made to a judge faced with making a purely
legal interpretation of the elements of a crime--considering the common law
and past precedent, statutes that concern the subject, and public policy argu-
ments in favor of a particular interpretation. In addition, even though this case
predated the Revolution and subsequent adoption of the Constitution, Hamil-
ton's statement regarding the inherent liberty of colonists to oppose governmen-
tal power through truthful language can be seen as a precursor to arguments
regarding the constitutionality of the law of seditious libel. Consequently, Ham-
ilton's statements could be read to advocate not only the jury deciding issues of
law, but also a rudimentary type of jury review.
Faced with increasingly hostile colonial juries, the British government
responded by limiting their ability to hear contentious cases.87 First, the British
expanded the jurisdiction of admiralty courts, which did not have juries, to al-
low the courts to hear cases involving revenue owed to the British.88 Under the
81 See, e.g., AMAR's BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 84 (citing Zenger for the proposition
that "[c]olonial grand juries flexed their muscles to resist unpopular prosecutions."); Magliocca,
supra note 22, at 191 ("[T]he Zenger trial was but the first example of jury resistance to Imperial
authority, and soon revolutionary activists adapted [sic] colonial practice to fulfill the jury's poten-
tial as a mobilizer of constitutional change.").
82 See, e.g., Huestis, supra note 60, at 74 (describing the Zenger trial as one of the most fa-
mous trials of jury nullification); Parmenter, supra note 6, at 383-84 (indicating that the Zenger
trial popularized jury nullification in the time leading up to the Revolution); John T. Reed, Com-
ment, Penn, Zenger and O.J.: Jury Nullification-Justice or the "Wacko-Fringe's" Attempt to
Further its Anti-Government Agenda?, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 1125, 1132 (1996) (citing Zenger as an
example of jury nullification of oppressive colonial laws).
83 See Pepper, supra note 21, at 615-17.
84 See id. at 616.
85 Id.
96 ALEXANDER, supra note 77, at 99; Pepper, supra note 21, at 616.
87 See Brief History, supra note 5, at 875; Harrington, supra note 55, at 394-96.
88 Brief History, supra note 5, at 875.
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Administration of Justice Act of 1774, English officials charged with crimes
could be tried in England instead of the colonies, where they would have un-
doubtedly faced more hostile juries. 89 In addition, Parliament stated that colo-
nists accused of treason would be tried in Britain instead of in America, effec-
tively denying the accused the right to be tried by a jury of his peers.a° Edmund
Burke, a member of the House of Commons yet sympathetic towards the Amer-
ican colonies, described the unjustness of this practice: "[Birought hither in the
dungeon of a ship's hold ... he is vomited into a dungeon on land, loaded with
irons, unfurnished with money, unsupported by friends, three thousand miles
from all means of calling upon or confronting evidence . ... 91 Not surpris-
ingly, the attempts by the British to limit the role of the jury only escalated the
tensions between the British and the colonists,92 and these actions greatly con-
tributed to the desire to fight for colonial independence.93
Thus, juries in colonial America had even more power than their British
counterparts to render verdicts in accordance with their own views of the law.
Colonial jurists sometimes used this power to rebel against oppressive British
control, with the Zenger trial being the most notable example. British attempts
to curtail this power only heightened the already considerable tension between
themselves and the colonists, and it ultimately played a part in the American
revolution.
1II. FOUNDERS' CONCEPTION OF THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
This part analyzes the right to trial by jury as it was envisioned by the
Founders. In particular, the Founders staunchly believed that juries played an
essential role in the success of a democracy, by protecting against governmental
overreaching, by enabling citizens to participate in the democratic process, and
by operating as a central figure in the administration of justice. The right to
decide issues of law and the related right to decide the constitutionality of laws
fit in with the Founders' conception of the jury, as evidenced by the writings of
the Founders and the actual practices at that time.
89 Harrington, supra note 55, at 394.
90 See id. at 394.
91 2 EDMUND BURKE, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, in THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT
HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 189, 192 (9th ed. 1889).
92 Harrington, supra note 55, at 395-96.
93 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20-21 (U.S. 1776) (listing among the griev-
ances against King George III "depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury" and
"transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences."); see also Smith, supra note 4, at
424 (describing several actions leading up to the Declaration of Independence that indicated colo-
nists' anger over the deprivation of the right to trial by jury).
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A. Prevailing Theories on the Nature of the Right to Trial by Jury
The right to trial by jury held a central place in the Founding Fathers'
vision of an ideal democratic society, with the right to trial by jury in criminal
cases protected by the Constitution 94 and Sixth Amendment, 95 and the right to
trial by jury in civil cases protected by the Seventh Amendment.96 During the
Constitutional Convention, the protection of the right to trial by jury had wide-
spread support among both Federalists and Anti-Federalists, as evidenced by
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 83:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the [Constitutional]
[C]onvention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the
value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any difference
between them it consists of this: the former regard it as a valu-
able safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palla-
dium of free government. 97
Elbridge Gerry, a staunch advocate of jury rights, declared that "the jury
was 'adapted to the investigation of truth beyond any other [system] the world
can produce.'98
Given the great importance the Founders put on securing the right to
trial by jury, it might seem odd that the specifics of the right were not well de-
lineated in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights,99 and indeed the implemen-
tation of the right varied throughout the country.'0° Such flexibility may well
have been by design; according to Alexander Hamilton, "It would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to suggest any general regulation [on the right to trial
94 U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment;
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed....").
95 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed .... ).
96 U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.").
97 THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Brief History, supra note 5, at 871.
But see Harrington, supra note 55, at 398-99 (suggesting that the Founders may have become
wary of the power of the jury).
98 Changing Role, supra note 10, at 171-72 (quoting Elbridge Gerry, Observations on the New
Constitution, in 2 THE FEDERALIST AND OTHER CONsTrruTIONAL PAPERS 714, 720 (E.H. Scott ed.,
1894)).
99 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; U.S. CONST. amend VI; U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 3; THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20-21 (U.S. 1776).
100 Howe, supra note24, at 596-98 and nn.57-58.
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by jury] that would be acceptable to all the States in the Union, or that would
perfectly quadrate with the several State institutions." 101 Nevertheless, if a jury
is to be a "safeguard to liberty" or the "palladium of free government" as the
Founders so intended,' °2 one must endeavor to understand the Founders' con-
ception of the jury, so that the jury is equipped with the powers necessary to
carry out this vision. Among the most important functions of the jury are as
protector against government overreaching, as an essential participant in democ-
racy, and as a central figure in the judicial system. 103
Given the prominent role of juries in colonial America in cases such as
the trial of John Peter Zenger and other instances in which juries used their
powers of indictment and rendering verdicts to rebel against British control, the
Founders conceived of the jury as a "bulwark against the unjust use of govern-
mental power." 1°4 Writings and statements by the Founders and their contempo-
raries provide the best evidence of how wide-spread this conception of the jury
was among the Founders, irrespective of other political differences. Alexander
Hamilton, a leading Federalist, wrote that "[alrbitrary impeachments, arbitrary
methods of prosecuting pretended offenses, and arbitrary punishments upon
arbitrary convictions, have ever appeared to me to be the great engines of
judicial despotism" and that the right to trial by jury in criminal cases operates
as a check on these arbitrary government actions. 10 5 In response to complaints
that the then-proposed Constitution did not contain provisions protecting the
right to jury trial in civil cases, Theophilus Parsons, a Federalist, stated that
[t]he people themselves have it in their power effectually to re-
sist usurpation, without being driven to an appeal to arms. An
act of usurpation is not obligatory; it is not law; and any man
may be justified in his resistance. Let him be considered as a
criminal by the general government; yet only his fellow citizens
can convict him; They are his jury, and if they pronounce him
innocent, not all the powers of congress can hurt him; and inno-
cent they certainly will pronounce him, if the supposed law he
resisted was an act of usurpation.'
6
The Anti-Federalists were likewise concerned about the abuses of gov-
ernmental power, and even moreso than the Federalists, they advocated for more
101 THIE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
102 See id.
103 See generally AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 83-110 (describing the multi-
faceted roles of the jury in early America).
i4 Changing Role, supra note 10, at 172; see also PouND, supra note 4, at 115; discussion
supra Part H.B.
105 THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
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explicit protections of the jury in the Constitution.' °7 According to an Anti-
Federalist pamphlet, "[j]udges, unincumbered [sic] by juries, have been ever
found much better friends to government than to the people. Such judges will
always be more desirable than juries to... those who wish to enslave the people
.... 9108 The Anti-Federalists felt so strongly about the jury's protective role
that they threatened to block ratification of the Constitution if the right was not
expressly included. 1°9 Summing up his personal views on the meaning of the
right to trial by jury, Thomas Jefferson declared that "I consider [trial by jury] as
the only anchor yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the
principles of its constitution."'10
In addition to the Founders' conception of the jury as a protector against
government oppression, the jury was viewed more generally as an outlet for
participation in the fledgling democratic government."' Again, the words of the
Founders themselves provide the best insight into this role. Thomas Jefferson,
considering the citizens' participation in government, wrote that "[w]ere I called
upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legislative or Ju-
diciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the Legisla-
tive. ' 12 According to Herbert J. Storing, a historian of Anti-Federalists, "The
question was not fundamentally whether the lack of an adequate provision for
jury trial would weaken a traditional bulwark of individual rights (although that
was also involved), but whether it would fatally weaken the role of the people in
107 See Alan Howard Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh
Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 142, 146-50 (1991).
108 Essays of An Old Whig (VIII), in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 49 (Herbert J. Storing
ed., University of Chicago Press 1981).
109 Jeffrey R. White, State Farm and Punitive Damages: Call the Jury Back, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L.
79 (2005). William Blackstone, a contemporary of the Anti-Federalists, wrote that
[t]he impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and
our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that be entirely entrusted
to the magistracy, a select body of men, and those generally selected by the
prince or such as enjoy the highest offices in the state, their decisions, in
spight [sic] of their own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary
bias toward those of their own rank and dignity : it is not to be expected from
human nature that the few should always be attentive to the interests and good
of the many.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 379 (16th ed. 1825); see
White, supra at 134.
110 3 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (H.A. Washington ed.,
Taylor & Maury 1853); see William V. Dorsaneo, II, Reexamining the Right to Trial by Jury, 54
SMU L. REv. 1695, 1696 (2001).
II See AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 94.
112 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbd Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 282, 283 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). John Adams echoed Jefferson's senti-
ment that citizens should be involved in the democratic process through serving on juries, writing
that "the common people, should have as complete a control, as decisive a negative, in every
judgment of a court of judicature" as in the legislature. ADAMS, supra note 1, at 253.
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the administration of government."' 1 3 The early American jury may in fact
have fulfilled this role; Alexis de Tocqueville, describing a visit to America,
called the jury "first and foremost a political institution" H14 and "a form of popu-
lar sovereignty."' 15
What were the Founders' reasons for ensuring that citizens had the op-
portunity to participate in government through serving on the jury? Legal scho-
lars have suggested several theories, which include benefits to the citizens them-
selves, as well as benefits to the government as a whole." 6 First, service on a
jury enables jurors to learn more about their legal rights, ultimately teaching
them to function more effectively as citizens in a democratic society." 7 Accord-
ing to the Federal Farmer, service on a jury was the "means by which the people
are let into the knowledge of public affairs-are enabled to stand as the guardi-
ans of each others rights, and to restrain, by regular and legal measures, those
who otherwise might infringe upon them."'" 8 Alexis de Tocqueville described
this function of jury service in America, noting that "the jury.., is also the most
effective means of teaching the people how to rule."' 19 In this way, the right to
jury trial can be seen not only as an individual right accorded to litigants, but
also as a valuable legal institution benefiting jurors themselves. 20
In addition to the role that service on a jury plays in teaching citizens
about democracy and their legal rights, the jury also can be seen as an integral
part of the judicial branch, in what has been termed by the constitutional theorist
John Taylor of Caroline as the "lower judicial bench" in a bicameral judici-
ary.121 Such a formulation of the judicial branch is appealing given the checks-
and-balances that are prevalent throughout the branches of government, in par-
ticular the bicameralism found in the legislative branch. 122 Anti-Federalist writ-
113 HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 19 (1981).
114 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 313 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., The
Library of America 2004) (1835).
115 Id. at 315.
116 See, e.g., AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 93-96 (jurors as students of the law and
as lower branch in bicameral judiciary); Brief History, supra note 5, at 876 (jurors as students of
the law); Scheiner, supra note 107, at 153-56 (jurors as last redoubt of self-government); Middle-
brooks, supra note 26, at 387-88 (jurors as part of lower branch in bicameral judiciary).
117 See AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 93-94.
118 Letters From The Federal Fanner, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 320 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter Federal Fanner]; see also Scheiner, supra note 107, at 154.
119 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 114, at 318; see also AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11,
at 93 (using de Tocqueville's descriptions of the American juror as evidence of the role of juror as
student).
120 See Scheiner, supra note 107, at 155 (describing the "empowering and enabling" functions
of jury service).
121 JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNIrED STATES 209 (Yale Univ. Press 1950) (1814); AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at
95; Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 387.
122 See AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 95.
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ings from that time confirm that some Founders shared this conception of the
jury. 123 Furthermore, the arguments made by Andrew Hamilton in the trial of
John Peter Zenger illustrate this role of the jury in action; Hamilton called upon
the jurors to make purely legal determinations similar to those made by a judge,
and to further provide a check on the judge's legal determinations.' 24 Given the
wide publicity of Zenger's trial, 125 these arguments no doubt influenced the
Founders' conception of the proper role of the jury.
In carrying out its functions as a protector against governmental over-
reaching and as a participant in the democratic processes, the jury was con-
ceived by the Founders to be a central figure in the administration of justice. 26
Not only were the rights to jury trials guaranteed through the federal Constitu-
tion and Bill of Rights, but the right to jury trials in criminal cases was also
widely guaranteed by the states in their own constitutions enacted prior to the
Constitutional Convention. 127 In fact, all of the original states preserved the
right to jury trials in civil cases through constitutional provision, statute, or by
judicial decision.128 The Federal Farmer declared that "[t]he jury trial... is by
far the most important feature in the judicial department in a free country...
,,129 In addition, the influence of the jury extended outside the courtroom and
into the society at large.130 Alexis de Tocqueville described the unique role of
the jury thusly: "It would be a very narrow view to look upon the jury as a mere
judicial institution; for however great its influence may be upon the decisions of
the courts, it is still greater on the destinies of society at large."'
13
'
B. The Founders' Conception of the Right of the Jury to Decide Issues of
Law
At the time of the Founding, it was almost universally accepted that ju-
ries in criminal cases had the right to decide issues of law; in addition, juries
123 See, e.g., Essays by a Farmer (IV), in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 38 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981) (describing the jury as "the democratic branch of the judicial power more neces-
sary than representatives in the legislature."); Federal Farmer, supra note 118, at 320 (declaring
that through juries "drawn from the body of the people ... we secure to the people at large, their
just and rightful control [sic] in the judicial department.").
124 See discussion supra Part II.B.
12 See Brief History, supra note 5, at 873-74.
126 See AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 96-98.
127 See Levy, supra note 12, at 269.
128 Smith, supra note 4, at 423-24.
129 Federal Farmer, supra note 118, at 320.
130 Smith, supra note 4, at 421-22.
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generally decided issues of law in civil cases during this time. 32 Often, these
rights were codified in state constitutions or statutes, or were accorded in judi-
cial decisions. 33 A contemporary dictionary even recognized this right in the
context of criminal cases in its definition of the word "jury," stating that juries,
"consisting usually of twelve men, attend courts to try matters of fact in civil
causes, and to decide both the law and the facts in criminal prosecutions."'
134
Several scholars who have examined the jury's right to decide issues of
law in early America have theorized that this right developed more as a result of
practical considerations instead of strongly-held philosophical beliefs about the
role of the jury.135 Unlike judges in England, most judges in America had little
formal legal training; 136 American judges were often administrative or legisla-
tive officials or other prominent members of the local community.'37 In Rhode
Island, for instance, knowledge of the law was not a requirement for holding a
judicial office. 38 In fact, judges in Rhode Island apparently did not issue jury
instructions until 1833.39 Judges in Rhode Island "held office not for the pur-
pose of deciding causes, for the jury decided all questions of law and fact; but
merely to preserve order, and see that the parties had a fair chance with the
jury."'14 Given that jurors were often as knowledgeable as judges regarding
issues of law, it may have been natural for jurors to decide both issues of law
and fact in a case.
14 1
132 R.J. Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J. 194,
202 (1932); Smith, supra note 4, at 446-47; Changing Role, supra note 10, at 172-73.
133 See Smith, supra note 4, at 446-48 and n.300-02 (providing examples of state constitutions
and statutes adopted around the time of the Revolution that guaranteed the jury's right to decide
issues of law).
134 NOAH WEBSTER, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828); Clay S. Conrad,
Jury Nullification as a Defense Strategy, 2 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 6 (1995). Another legal
dictionary widely used in colonial Virginia stated that "(i]f a jury take upon them the knowledge
of the law, and give a general verdict, it is good; but in cases of difficulty, it is best and safest to
find the special matter, and to leave it to the judges to determine what is the law upon the fact."
JACOB'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1782).
135 See, e.g., Brief History, supra note 5, at 903-06 (suggesting that the jury's role in deciding
issues of law arose due to the lack of judges who were educated in the law); Harrington, supra
note 55, at 378-79 (citing the lack of formal legal training of judges as a contributing factor to the
power of the jury); WILLIAM EDWARD NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE
IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 28-30 (Univ. of Ga Press
1994) (1975) (describing how the Massachusetts judicial system itself contributed to the jury's
role in deciding issues of law in Massachusetts courts).
136 See Brief History, supra note 5, at 903-05 (describing the lack of formal legal training
among judges in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and New Hampshire).
137 Harrington, supra note 55, at 378.
138 Amasa M. Eaton, The Development of the Judicial System in Rhode Island, 14 YALE L.J.
148, 153-54 (1905).
139 Brief History, supra note 5, at 904.
140 Howe, supra note 24, at 591 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
141 See Harrington, supra note 55, at 378-79; Brief History, supra note 5, at 904.
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Along with the relative lack of formal legal training among judges,
some of the early American court systems themselves may have given juries the
de facto power to decide issues of law. One of the most prominent of these sys-
tems was that of Massachusetts, which held trials before at least three judges
who would each give their own opinions concerning the law in the jury instruc-
tions.142 When the judges' opinions conflicted with one another, the jury was
free to decide which of the opinions to follow.143 Professor William E. Nelson
concluded from the structure of this system that juries in Massachusetts had
virtually unlimited authority to decide the law.144 Even judges in other jurisdic-
tions made it clear that their interpretation of the law was not binding upon the
jurors. 145
Based on the aforementioned circumstances, one might conclude that
the jury's right to decide issues of law arose solely from considerations of prac-
ticality, and thus the right should not be considered an integral part of the Foun-
ders' conception of the jury. On the contrary, even though the jury's right to
decide issues of law "may have arisen from haphazard practice at the time,"
146
by the time of the Revolution the right to decide issues of law was central to the
jury's role in society. As defense counsel in the case of People v. Croswell,147
Alexander Hamilton argued that
it is not only the province of the jury, in all criminal cases, to
judge of the intent with which the act was done, as being parcel
of the fact; they are also authorized to judge of the law as con-
nected with the fact.... In England, trial by jury has always
been cherished, as the great security of the subject against the
oppression of government; but it never could have been a solid
refuge and security, unless the jury had the right to judge of the
intent and the law.
148
Hamilton further stated that the jury should make legal determinations based not
only upon the judge's opinion, but also upon arguments of counsel and "law
authorities that are read," suggesting that the jury should have an active, inde-
pendent role in deciding issues of law. 149 These arguments indicate that Hamil-
142 NELSON, supra note 135, at 26.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 28; see also Smith, supra note 4, at 448.
145 Harrington, supra note 55, at 379; see Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The
Jury and the Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 997, 1031 (2007).
146 See Brief History, supra note 5, at 906.
147 3 Johns Cas. 337, 362 (N.Y. 1804) (emphasis in original).
148 Id.
149 Id.
(The jury ought, undoubtedly, to pay every respectful regard to the opinion of
the court; but suppose a trial in a capital case, and the jury are satisfied from
[Vol. I111
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 111, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss3/9
THE 'TRUE'RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
ton viewed the jury's right to decide issues of law to be of much more signifi-
cance than considerations of practicality and convenience, for he directly linked
the jury's right to decide issues of law to the role of the jury in protecting
against governmental overreaching. His statements further indicate that he be-
lieved that the right included making pure legal determinations, and not just
refusing to apply an unjust law.
Like Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson recognized the right of jurors to de-
cide issues of law under circumstances in which there could be the potential for
governmental or judicial oppression. In Notes on the State of Virginia, he
wrote:
[I]t is usual for the jurors to decide the fact, and to refer the law
arising on it to the decision of the judges. But this division of
the subject lies with their discretion only. And if the question
relate to any point of public liberty, or if it be one of those in
which the judges may be suspected of bias, the jury undertake
to decide both law and fact.
150
This passage also suggests that Jefferson viewed the right to decide issues of
law as essential to the jury's role as a "bulwark of liberty."' 51
James Wilson, an extensive contributor to the Constitution, also con-
firmed the right of the jury to decide issues of law when he wrote:
Suppose that, after all the precautions taken to avoid it, a differ-
ence of sentiment takes place between the judges and the jury
with regard to a point of law .... What must the jury to do? The
jury must do their duty and their whole duty. They must decide
the law as well as the fact.
52
Wilson's writings reveal that his conception of the jury's role in deciding issues
of law was similar to the idea that the jury was to act like the lower branch in a
bicameral judiciary, empowered to decide issues of law in a similar manner as a
the arguments of counsel, the law authorities that are read, and their own
judgment, .... that the law arising in the case is different from that which the
court advances, are they not bound by their oaths, by their duty to their creator
and themselves, to pronounce according to their own convictions?)
Id.; see also Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 375 (discussing People v. Croswell and Hamilton's
arguments to the jury).
150 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1781-1782), reprinted in WRITINGS:
AUTOBIOGRAPHY, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PAPERS, ADDRESSES,
LETTERS, at 256 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (1781-1782).
151 Harrington, supra note 55, at 388.
152 JAMES WILSON, 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 540 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., Harv.
Univ. Press 1967); accord Pepper, supra note 21, at 617-18.
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judge.' 53 Wilson wrote that juries "must determine [legal] questions, as judges
must determine them, according to law."' 54 Wilson clarified the types of
sources that should be relied upon by juries in making decisions, stating that
"law, particularly the common law, is governed by precedents, and customs, and
authorities, and maxims: those precedents, and customs, and authorities, and
maxims are alike obligatory upon jurors as upon judges, in deciding questions of
law."' 155 While other Founders recognized that the jury's right to decide issues
of law furthered its role as a protector of the people against governmental over-
reaching, Wilson associated the jury's right to decide issues of law with its role
as a central participant in the administration of justice. 56
John Adams, a vigorous proponent of the jury's right to decide issues of
law, arguably went further in his writings than did other Founders, for his writ-
ings overtly recognized the jury's right to decide the constitutionality of laws. 157
According to Adams,
[t]he general rules of law and common regulations of society,
under which ordinary transactions arrange themselves, are well
enough known to ordinary jurors. The great principles of the
constitution are intimately known; they are sensibly felt by
every Briton; it is scarcely extravagant to say they are drawn in
and imbibed with the nurse's milk and first air.'
58
If a judge made a ruling that violated one of these fundamental constitutional
principles, Adams believed that a juror had a duty "to find the verdict according
to his own best understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in direct oppo-
sition to the direction of the court."'159 Scholars commenting upon Adams' writ-
ings have associated them with the now-defunct "natural rights" theory-the
theory that there was a natural law independent of positive law developed by
society, and that the natural law should be used as the preferred source of law
when the two conflicted.' 6° While his writings do share similarities with the
natural rights theory, they are distinguishable in that Adams focused on the ju-
rors' understanding of the positive law and constitutional principles, rather than
153 See WILSON, supra note 152, at 542.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See Pepper, supra note 21, at 617-18.
157 See ADAMS, supra note 1, at 254-55.
158 Id. at 255.
159 Id. at 254-55; see also id. at 254 ("Therefore, the jury have a power of deciding an issue
upon a general verdict. And, if they have, is it not an absurdity to suppose that the law would
oblige them to find a verdict according to the direction of the court, against their own opinion,
judgment, and conscience?").
16o See, e.g., Changing Role, supra note 10, at 172. See generally POUND, supra note 4, at 129-
32 (describing the natural rights theory and its effect on the philosophy of jury verdicts).
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calling upon jurors to render verdicts based solely on their conception of a "nat-
ural law."'
16 1
Adams' conception of the jury having the right to decide the constitu-
tionality of laws was not just theoretically plausible, it was in fact happening in
colonial America prior to the Revolution. Henry Hulton, the British revenue
commissioner, asked how his men could perform their duties "before a Jury of
the People [who] had held the very Laws under which the officers acted, to be
Unconstitutional."' 162 Moreover, as noted in Part ll.B, Andrew Hamilton had
advocated a form of jury review in the Zenger case itself. Given the statements
regarding the role of the jury from Founders such as Thomas Jefferson, who
considered a jury trial "the only anchor... by which a government can be held
to the principles of its constitution,"1 63 it appears that many Founders considered
the right to jury review as necessary to ensure that the jury would be able to
execute its roles as a protector against governmental overreaching and as an
independent actor in the judicial system.
Even assuming that the jury's right to decide issues of law arose out of
conditions in colonial America, the Founders seemingly integrated that right
into their conception of the jury's roles in American society-as a protector
against governmental overreaching, as a participant in the democratic process,
and as a central figure in the administration of justice. Arguably, the Founders
also considered the jury's right to decide the constitutionality of laws as essen-
tial to fulfilling these roles.
IV. EROSION OF THE JURY'S RIGHT TO DECIDE ISSUES OF LAW IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
This Part first details the recognition of the jury's right to decide issues
of law immediately following the Revolution and continuing into the early part
of the nineteenth century. While there was no uniformity among the federal
courts and the states, the right to decide issues of law was accepted as common-
place, and the right to decide the constitutionality of laws was at least somewhat
implicitly accepted. In the 1830s, courts began narrowing the role of the jury in
deciding issues of law, which culminated in the 1895 decision in Sparf v. United
States. Accordingly, by the end of the nineteenth century, juries no longer had
the right to decide issues of law, and, to the extent that juries ever had the right
to decide the constitutionality of laws, that right was completely foreclosed.
161 See Pepper, supra note 21, at 618 (suggesting that Adams' use of the term "conscience"
should be interpreted in the context of making legal determinations and not interpreted more
broadly).
162 JOHN PHILLIP REID, IN A REBELLIOUS SPIRIT 34 (1979); Magliocca, supra note 22, at 194.
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A. Early Recognition of the Right to Decide Issues of Law
If there was any doubt about whether the jury's right to decide issues of
law had survived the American Revolution, such doubt was promptly laid to rest
in the 1794 case of Georgia v. Brailsford,164 a civil trial in which the United
States Supreme Court had original jurisdiction.165 The case involved a dispute
between the state of Georgia and a British subject regarding which party was
legally entitled to an outstanding debt.166 The facts of the case were agreed
upon by the parties, leaving the jury to decide the case based on its determina-
tion of the law. 167 In Chief Justice Jay's instructions to the jury, he first gave the
jury the unanimous opinion of the Court regarding the legal issues raised in the
case. 168 Rather than directing the jury to base its decision solely on the opinion
of the Court, Chief Justice Jay continued:
It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the
good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the
jury, on questions of law, it is the province of the court to de-
cide. But it must be observed that by the same law, which rec-
ognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have
nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both,
and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On
this, and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt,
you will pay that respect, which is due to the opinion of the
court: For, as on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the
best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable, that the
court[s] are the best judges of law. But still both objects are
lawfully, within your power of decision.'69
During deliberations, the jury returned to ask the Court to advise the
jury further on two purely legal questions. 170 After receiving explanations on
these two issues, the jury rendered a verdict that was consistent with the Court's
opinion on the matter.
171
While many scholars have relied upon Georgia v. Brailsford in support
of the proposition that the jury's right to decide issues of law was widely ac-
164 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 3 (1794); see Pepper, supra note 21, at 620 (providing an analysis of
Chief Justice Jay's instructions to the jury regarding its right to decide issues of law and fact).
165 Jones, supra note 145, at 1035-36.
166 Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 1.
167 Id. at 4.
168 Id.
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cepted at this time, some scholars have downplayed its significance. 173 In
particular, scholars suggesting that the jury's right to decide law should be more
narrowly construed have relied upon Chief Justice Jay's instructions to the jury
that the court is best equipped to decide questions of law and that the jury
should respect the court's opinion as to these matters, going so far as to suggest
that the Court was effectively giving a directed verdict in the case.1 74 Scholars
have pointed out that the jury actually sought advice from the Court on legal
issues and ultimately heeded the Court's opinions, further giving credence to the
idea that the jury did not decide issues of law for itself. 75 While these conten-
tions have appeal at first blush, they seem to confuse the existence of the right
of the jury to decide issues of law with how that right was exercised in the par-
ticular case before the Court. It is true that the Court gave its opinion on the
legal issues in the case; however, it also recognized that the final determination
of the issues of law and issues of fact were "lawfully[] within [the jury's] power
of decision."17 6 Although the jury sought the advice of the Court regarding sev-
eral legal issues, this action was consistent with the notion that the jury should
make its determinations based on an informed understanding of the law. 177 The
fact that the jury ultimately followed the Court's opinion does not diminish its
right to decide issues of law contrary to that of the court in other circumstances;
rather, it only shows that such a departure was not warranted in this case.
Although the Supreme Court did not directly address the role of the jury
in deciding issues of law for the next century, 78 lower federal courts continued
to recognize the right, including decisions involving Supreme Court Justices
who were riding the circuit.179 For example, in Henfield's Case, 80 Justice Wil-
son first instructed the jury regarding the significance of its decision, stating that
"[lhis is, gentlemen of the jury, a case of the first importance. Upon your ver-
dict the interests of four millions of your fellow-citizens may be said to depend.
But whatever be the consequence, it is your duty, it is our duty, to do only what
172 See, e.g., Changing Role, supra note 10, at 173-74; Brief History, supra note 5, at 907;
Jones, supra note 145, at 1035-36; Farley, supra note 132, at 232.
173 See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article Ii Jury, 87 VA. L. REv. 587,
626-29 (2001); Pepper, supra note 21, at 620-21.
174 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 173, at 628-29.
175 Pepper, supra note 21, at 621.
176 Georgia v. Brailsford, U.S. (3 Dali.) 1, 4 (1794).
177 See WILSON, supra note 152, at 540-42; discussion supra Part III.B.
178 Nevertheless, in Bingham v. Cabot, Justice Iredell reaffirmed the right of the jury to decide
issues of law contrary to the court's opinion, asserting that "though the jury will generally respect
the sentiments of the court on points of law, they are not bound to deliver a verdict conformably to
them." Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19, 33 (1795).
179 Pepper, supra note 21, at 621. For an extensive listing of cases in which Supreme Court
Justices reaffirmed the law-finding function of juries, see Howe, supra note 24, at 589 n.22.
180 Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C. Pa. 1793).
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is right."'18 1 After explaining the court's interpretation of the law to the jury,
Justice Wilson concluded by stating "that the jury, in a general verdict, must
decide both law and fact, but that this did not authorize them to decide it as they
pleased; they were as much bound to decide by law as the judges: the responsi-
bility was equal upon both."182 In the treason trial of Aaron Burr in 1807, Chief
Justice Marshall declared in his jury instructions that "[t]he jury have now heard
the opinions of the court on the law of the case. They will apply that law to the
facts and will find a verdict of guilty or not guilty as their own consciences may
direct." 183 These jury instructions support the proposition that federal courts
continued to recognize the jury's right to decide issues of law in the early nine-
teenth century. Although the jury's right to decide questions of law was not
uniform throughout the states, evidence suggests that this right was widely ac-
cepted in the first half of the nineteenth century.184 By 1851, at least nine states
had given juries the right to decide issues of law through constitutional provi-
sion or statute, and at least six other states had recognized the jury's right to
decide issues of law by judicial decision. 185 For example, the Massachusetts
legislature enacted a statute in 1808 giving the jury the right to decide both the
facts and law when rendering a general verdict.1 86 Although the precise effect of
the statute is unknown, judicial decisions in Massachusetts prior to 1840 gener-
ally recognized the jury's right to decide issues of law in criminal cases notwith-
standing the statute.
187
In an 1804 seditious libel case in New York, People v. Croswell,1
88
Judge Kent not only affirmed the jury's right to decide issues of law in criminal
cases, but he also addressed a distinction increasingly made by people between
the jury's power to decide issues of law and its right to make such decisions. 189
In rebuffing the notion that the jury merely had the power to decide issues of
law, Judge Kent reasoned that
[t]he law must, however, have intended, in granting this power
to a jury, to grant them a lawful and rightful power, or it would
have provided a remedy against the undue exercise of it. The
181 Id. at 1119.
182 Id. at 1120-21 (emphasis added). For more information regarding the significance of Jus-
tice Wilson's instructions in Henfield's Case, see Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 377-79.
183 Brief History, supra note 5, at 907.
'8 Id. at 910; see Changing Role, supra note 10, at 174-76 (describing the jury's right to de-
cide issues of law in Massachusetts). See generally Howe, supra note 24 (providing a detailed
account of the decline of the jury's right to decide issues of law in several states).
185 Brief History, supra note 5, at 910.
186 Changing Role, supra note 10, at 174.
187 Id at 175-76.
188 People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
189 Id.; Farley, supra note 132, at 202-03 (describing the importance of the case).
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true criterion of a legal power, is its capacity to produce a de-
finitive effect liable neither to censure nor review. And the ver-
dict of not guilty, in a criminal case, is, in every respect, abso-
lutely final. The jury are not liable to punishment, nor the ver-
dict to control. No attaint lies, nor can a new trial be awarded.
The exercise of this power in the jury has been sanctioned, and
upheld in constant activity, from the earliest ages. 190
According to Judge Kent, the fact that the jury was given the power to decide
issues of law without reservation implied that the jury not only had the power to
decide issues of law, but the right to decide issues of law as well.
While the jury's right to decide issues of law was consistently recog-
nized in America in the first several decades following the Revolution, the right
to jury review was considerably less clear, likely due in part to the infrequency
with which the right would be addressed in judicial proceedings.
Typically, any debate regarding the existence of the right would only arise when
an attorney attempted to argue the unconstitutionality of a statute to the jury.191
The most famous of these early cases was United States v. Callender,192 which
involved the prosecution of James Callender for seditious libel against the Pres-
ident of the United States. 193 When William Wirt, counsel for the defense, at-
tempted to argue the unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act, Justice Chase im-
mediately interrupted him and told him to take a seat.194 Justice Chase told Wirt
that arguing the constitutionality of a statute "is irregular and inadmissible; it is
not competent to the jury to decide on this point .... ,195 An exchange between
Justice Chase and William Wirt ensued, in which Wirt attempted to convince
Chase that the jury's right to decide issues of law necessarily included a right to
decide the constitutionality of laws:
CHASE, Circuit Justice. No man will deny your law-we all
know that juries have the right to decide the law, as well as the
fact-and the constitution is the supreme law of the land, which
controls all laws which are repugnant to it.
Mr. Wirt. Since, then, the jury have a right to consider the law,
and since the constitution is law, the conclusion is certainly syl-
logistic, that the jury have a right to consider the constitution.
190 Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. at 366-68
191 AMAR's BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 98.
192 United States v. Callendar, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C. Va. 1800).
193 Id.; see also AMAR's BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 98-104 (analyzing Justice Chase's
arguments against jury review); Magliocca, supra note 22, at 204-07 (analyzing the case in the
larger context of jury review in the early 1800s).
194 Callendar, 25 F. Cas. at 252-53.
195 Id. at 253.
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CHASE, Circuit Justice. A non sequitur, sir.196
Justice Chase believed that the right to jury review was "very absurd
and dangerous" and "has a direct tendency to dissolve the union of the United
States," affording jurors greater power over laws than those in the national legis-
lature and leading to a lack of uniformity in the laws. 197 Ultimately, Justice
Chase did not allow Wirt to argue the unconstitutionality of the statute to the
jury.198
Some scholars have been quick to attack the theoretical underpinnings
and incoherent reasoning in Justice Chase's decision. 99 Notwithstanding these
arguments, Justice Chase's arguments likely had little de facto precedential ef-
fect due to the subsequent impeachment of Chase as a result of his conduct in
Callender and other cases. 200 Among the charges against Chase were that he
had tried "to wrest from the jury their indisputable right to hear argument, and
determine upon the question of the law, as well as on the question of fact, in-
volved in the verdict they are required to give."'2 ' While the impeachment did
not directly concern his refusal to allow counsel to argue the unconstitutionality
of the Sedition Act in Callender, his impeachment undoubtedly called into ques-
tion his handling of the Callender case specifically and his views of the law-
finding function of juries more generally.2 °2
Eight years after Callender, the right of counsel to argue the unconstitu-
tionality of a law to the jury arose again in United States v. The William,2 °3 a
case concerning the Embargo Act.2°4 Prior to trial, Judge John Davis deter-
mined the Embargo Act to be constitutional; 20 5 nevertheless, he allowed defense
196 Id. (emphasis added).
197 Id. at 256-57. In fact, Justice Chase suggested that allowing the jury to decide the constitu-
tionality of laws would itself be unconstitutional. See id. at 257.
198 Id. at 257.
199 See Magliocca, supra note 22, at 205-07; AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 98-
104.
200 Magliocca, supra note 22, at 205-07; see also Harrington, supra note 55, at 406-14 (provid-
ing a detailed account of Justice Chase's actions and his subsequent impeachment).
201 Articles of Impeachment, Art. I, § 3, in REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE HON. SAMUEL CHASE
app. 3 (1805). Even though Justice Chase seemed to accept the jury's right to decide issues of law
in Callender, he narrowly interpreted this right to only include the jury's right to apply the legal
standards determined by a judge to a particular case, not the right to determine the law itself. See
Harrington, supra note 55, at 414.
202 See Magliocca, supra note 22, at 207. But see Pepper, supra note 21, at 627-31 (suggesting
that since the impeachment of Chase did not include any explicit criticism of Chase's refusal to
allow the jury to decide the constitutionality of the Sedition Act, this lack of criticism implied that
Congress tacitly agreed with his denial of jury review).
203 28 F. Cas. 614 (C.C. Mass. 1808).
204 Id.; Magliocca, supra note 22, at 195-96.
205 See The William, 28 F. Cas. 614.
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counsel to argue the unconstitutionality of the Act to the jury.2 0 6 Ultimately, the
jury found the law to be unconstitutional. ° More importantly, Judge Davis
discussed Callender in his judicial opinion, including Justice Chase's denial of
the right to jury review.2 °s That Judge Davis allowed defense counsel to argue
the unconstitutionality of the Embargo Act to the jury, despite recognizing Jus-
tice Chase's decision to the contrary, implies that Justice Chase's views on the
right to jury review were not universally accepted by the early federal courts.
Even though the aforementioned decisions are far from conclusive on the issue,
they certainly do not foreclose the possibility that among the rights accorded to
these early juries was an implicit right to determine the constitutionality of
laws. 209
B. Tracing the Rapid Demise of the Jury's Right to Decide Issues of Law
Beginning in the early 1830s, federal courts began to question the set-
tled proposition that the jury possessed a broad right to decide issues of law.210
At first, courts made minor shifts in their jury instructions that implicitly limited
the right. In United States v. Fenwick,21' the court instructed the jury that "[i]n
criminal cases, the jury has a right to give a general verdict, and, in doing so,
must, of necessity, decide upon the law as well as upon the facts of the case.,
212
In a more narrow formulation of the right, Judge Cranch declared in United
States v. Stockwel 213 that
the right of the jury to decide the law, was only the right to find
a general verdict which includes both the law and the facts of
the case. That the question whether one fact can be inferred
206 Magliocca, supra note 22, at 196.
207 Id.
208 See The William, 28 F. Cas. at 617
(The immediate question that the learned judge was then considering, was,
whether the power of determining the constitutionality of the law belonged,
exclusively, to the court, or whether it could be rightfully exercised by a jury.
His remaining observations, appearing in the published account of the trial,
more especially apply to that question).
209 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 162-63 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting) (using United
States v. The William to support the notion that historically the jury had a broad right to decide the
law).
210 See Pepper, supra note 2 1, at 636.
211 United States v. Fenwick, 25 F. Cas. 1062 (C.C. D.C. 1836).
212 Id. at 1064; Pepper, supra note 21, at 636.
213 United States v. Stockwell, 27 F. Cas. 1347 (C.C. D.C. 1836).
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from another is a question of law, and to be decided by the court
214
If the jury's right to decide issues of law had been quietly chipped away
in the early 1830s, it was under direct attack in the 1835 case of United States v.
Battiste.1 5 Battiste involved a prosecution for violation of a statute that prohib-
ited slave trading; since the parties did not dispute the facts of the case, the deci-
sion rested on the interpretation of the statute.21 6 In his instructions to the jury,
Justice Joseph Story acknowledged that when juries decide criminal and civil
cases, "their verdict, when general, is necessarily compounded of law and of
fact; and includes both. In each they must necessarily determine the law, as
well as the fact., 217 However, he made an important qualification: "In each,
they have the physical power to disregard the law, as laid down to them by the
court. But I deny, that, in any case, civil or criminal, they have the moral right to
decide the law according to their own notions, or pleasure., 21 8 Instructing the
jury on its proper role, Justice Story declared that "[i]t is the duty of the court to
instruct the jury as to the law; and it is the duty of the jury to follow the law, as
it is laid down by the court." 2
19
Justice Story justified his views of the proper role of the jury due to his
fear that if juries were to decide purely legal questions, it would lead to a lack of
uniformity and predictability in the law, as well as no remedy against errors
made by the jury.220 He continued: "[B]elieving, as I do, that every citizen has a
right to be tried by the law, and according to the law; that it is his privilege and
truest shield against oppression and wrong; I feel it my duty to state my views
fully and openly on the present occasion. 22' Given the influence of Justice
Story's statements in Battiste on the future of the scope of the jury's law-finding
function,222 it is important to realize how his justifications directly conflict with
the conceptions of the jury and judge at the time of the Revolution. 223 The
Founders did not fear that citizens' rights would be inadequately protected by
juries; rather, many feared that citizens' rights could not be trusted in the hands
of the government, and in particular in the hands of judges whose power was
214 Id. at 1348 (emphasis added).
215 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C. Mass. 1835); see also Brief History, supra note 5, at 907-08.
216 See Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1042-45. For background information about the highly political
nature of this case, see Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 394-98.





222 See Harrington, supra note 55, at 425-26.
223 See supra Part III.A.
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224left unchecked by juries. In support of this proposition, Akhil Amar noted the
differences in the restrictions placed on judges and juries in the Bill of Rights,
which suggest that the Founders were much more wary of judicial overreaching
than of jury overreaching. 22  While the theoretical underpinnings of Justice
Story's views may have been flawed, his decision undeniably signaled a major
shift in courts' attitudes toward the proper role of the jury.226
The attack against the jury's right to decide issues of law continued in
the 1851 decision in United States v. Morris.227 The Morris decision arguably
went further than Battiste in limiting the right of the jury to decide issues of law;
moreover, the decision was significant because it concerned whether defense
228
counsel could argue the unconstitutionality of a law to the jury. The case
involved the prosecution of Robert Morris for violation of the Fugitive Slave
Act.229 When defense counsel attempted to argue the unconstitutionality of the
Fugitive Slave Act to the jury, Justice Benjamin Curtis stopped him from doing
so, and he only allowed counsel to make the argument to the court outside of the
hearing of the jury.230 Thereafter, Justice Curtis denied that the jury had a right
to determine the constitutionality of laws, looking to the structure of the Consti-
tution to conclude that Congress did not intend to empower unqualified indi-
viduals to decide constitutional issues but rather left that power to judges, who
were duty-bound by the Constitution to uphold the law and had to take an oath
to uphold the Constitution.231 Justice Curtis went further in denying the jury's
right to decide any questions of law, declaring that
under the [C]onstitution of the United States, juries, in criminal
trials, have not the right to decide any question of law; and that
if they render a general verdict, their duty and their oath require
them to apply to the facts, as they may find them, the law given
to them by the court.232
224 AMAR's BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 83-86.
225 See id. at 96-97.
226 See Harrington, supra note 55, at 425. Other federal cases denying the right of the jury to
decide issues of law include United States v. Riley, 27 F. Cas. 810 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1864); United
States v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863); Stettinius v. United States, 22 F. Cas.
1322 (C.C. D.C. 1839); United States v. Shive, 27 F. Cas. 1065 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1832).
227 United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C. Mass. 1851).
n8 See Magliocca, supra note 22, at 207-09 (discussing the parts of the Morris decision con-
cerning the right to jury review).
29 See Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 401-05 (providing a detailed account of the circum-
stances surrounding the Morris trial).
230 Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1331; Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 403.
231 Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1332.
232 Id. at 1336.
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In dismissing decades of prior precedent to the contrary, Justice Curtis
incredibly hypothesized that the Georgia v. Brailsford decision affirming the
jury's right to decide questions of law may have been misreported.233 The Mor-
ris decision thus represented another push towards the elimination of the jury's
law-finding function; whereas prior cases had acknowledged the tension be-
tween the elimination of the jury's right to decide issues of law and the jury's
power to render a general verdict,234 Justice Curtis' opinion suggested that even
when rendering a general verdict, the jury had no right to decide the law but
rather must always apply the law given to them by the court.235
While federal courts were increasingly constraining the jury's right to
decide issues of law in the mid-nineteenth century, state courts and legislatures
were slower to follow suit.236 Despite the inconsistency between states in their
recognition of the jury's right to decide questions of law, the general trend was
toward limiting or eliminating the right.237 In Massachusetts, for example, an
1845 supreme court decision declared that juries had no right to decide issues of
law, even though the right had been recognized in prior judicial decisions.238
The Massachusetts legislature responded by enacting a statute explicitly giving
criminal juries the right to decide questions of law and fact in criminal cases. 239
Within the same year, the Massachusetts supreme court decided a case in which
it interpreted the statute as merely a codification of the common law right to
render a general verdict and not a right to decide issues of law more generally. 24
°
In Vermont, an 1849 supreme court decision affirmed the jury's right to
decide the law in a manner contrary to that of the judge, rejecting the reasoning
in United States v. Battiste.24' In this and later decisions, the supreme court reit-
erated the need for the right to ensure that the state's citizens were protected
from the undue bias of judges or oppression by the courts.242 By 1892, however,
the same court announced that the jury's right to decide questions of law was
contrary to the common law, the practice in Great Britain and the United States,
and the federal and state constitutions.243 All told, between 1850 and 1931 the
233 Id. at 1334; see Magliocca, supra note 22, at 208-09.
234 See, e.g., United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545)
(acknowledging the jury's power to decide questions of law when rendering general verdicts).
235 Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1336.
236 Harrington, supra note 55, at 425-26; see Howe, supra note 24 (describing inconsistencies
in the recognition of the right between states and the unevenness in the recognition of the right
over time within states).
237 See Harrington, supra note 55, at 425-26.
238 Changing Role, supra note 10, at 176-77 (analyzing Commonwealth v. Porter, 51 Mass. (10
Met.) 263 (1845)).
239 Id. at 183.
240 Id. (discussing Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185 (1855)).
2A' See State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14 (1849); Howe, supra note 24, at 592.
242 Howe, supra note 24, at 592-93.
243 State v. Burpee, 25 A. 964, 974 (Vt. 1892); see Howe, supra note 24, at 593.
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courts in at least eleven states rejected the right of the jury to decide questions of
law. 24
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Sparf v. United
States245 effectively shut the door on the jury's right to decide questions of law
in this country.24 In Sparf, the majority opinion relied heavily on the reasoning
of the lower federal court decisions in Battiste and Morris and found that even
though juries "have the physical power to disregard the law, '4 7 that "it is the
duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law
to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.' ' 248 In spite of the preva-
lence of court decisions to the contrary and the unsettled nature of the issue, the
Court declared that "the duty of the jury to receive the law from the court...
has become firmly established. 249 Moreover, the Court determined that such a
system was necessary to protect societal and individual rights from the unpre-
dictability of a wayward jury.250 According to the Court, without the benefit of
a judge trained in the law to act as a buffer between the jury and the citizens,
"our government will cease to be a government of laws, and become a govern-
ment of men.,
251
Although Sparf did not specifically address the jury's right to decide the
constitutionality of laws, its reliance on Callender and Morris in support of its
denial of the jury's right to decide ordinary laws effectively doomed any right to
jury review as well.252 More generally, the decision undoubtedly played a role
in states denying the jury's right to decide issues of law.253 Only a few states
have ostensibly retained that right, but judicial decisions have all but eliminated
the practical effect of the right.254
By the end of the nineteenth century, the jury's right to decide issues of
law, expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Brailsford only
one century earlier, was effectively eliminated in both federal and state courts.
This dramatic shift occurred through a series of federal court decisions over the
244 Brief History, supra note 5, at 910.
245 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
246 Smith, supra note 4, at 452.
247 Sparf, 156 U.S. at 74.
248 Id. at 102.
249 Id. at 64. But see id. at 110-83 (Gray, J., dissenting) (reviewing historical cases and reach-
ing the opposite conclusion).
250 See id. at 102-03 ("Under any other system, the courts, although established in order to
declare the law, would for every practical purpose be eliminated from our system of government
as instrumentalities devised for the protection equally of society and of individuals in their essen-
tial rights.").
251 Id. at 103.
252 See Magliocca, supra note 22, at 209 (suggesting that the Sparf decision should have sepa-
rated ordinary legal interpretation from questions of constitutionality).
253 See Wilson, supra note 45, at 398.
254 See Smith, supra note 4, at 453; Wilson, supra note 45, at 398.
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second half of the nineteenth century, which gained traction throughout the
country and ultimately with a majority of the Supreme Court Justices in render-
ing their opinion in Spaf.
V. AN INEVITABLE CONCLUSION? EVALUATING THE DEMISE OF THE RIGHT
OF THE JURY TO DECIDE ISSUES OF LAW IN LIGHT OF FOUNDERS' CONCEPTION
OF THE JURY
As Part IV.B illustrates, the erosion of the jury's right to decide issues
of law was relatively quick in light of the prominent place that the right held in
the country's struggle for independence. Given that the jury's right to decide
issues of law was arguably an integral part of the Founders' conception of the
* 255jury, one might inquire as to the explanations for this shift, and whether any
of these explanations serve as a justification for the drastic narrowing of the role
of the jury. A number of reasons were put forth by courts deciding the issue at
the time, including the need for judges to protect citizens from the vagrancies ofU 25625
an impassioned jury, the desire for uniformity in the interpretation of laws,257
and the structure of the federal government. 58 Scholars have also posited theo-
ries regarding the demise of the right, such as the professionalization of the
practice of law, 259 the waning distrust of judges, 26° and the diversification of the
jury pool. 261However, none of these explanations fully considered the larger
social and political roles fulfilled by the jury at the time of the Founding or how
the jury's law-finding functions comported with these roles.
The prominent federal court decisions of the nineteenth century that de-
nied the right of the jury to decide questions of law shared much of the same
basic reasoning for reaching this result.262 One of the consistent themes across
several of the decisions was that the jury did not provide adequate protection for
the citizens in safeguarding their individual rights, and that the judge was neces-
sary to intercede on behalf of the citizens to interject the correct law into the
proceedings.263 While this theory may have had elements of truth in particular
judicial proceedings, it completely neglected the Founders' conception of the
255 See supra Part III.B.
256 See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102-03 (1895); United States v. Battiste, 24 F.
Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835).
257 See, e.g., Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043; United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 256-57
(C.C.D. Va. 1800).
258 See, e.g., Callender, 25 F. Cas. at 256-57; United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1331-
33 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
259 Brief History, supra note 5, at 915-17; Pepper, supra note 21, at 639-40.
260 See Pepper, supra note 21, at 639-40.
261 See Changing Role, supra note 10, at 191-92; Harrington, supra note 55, at 435-36.
262 See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239; Battiste, 24
F. Cas. 1042; Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323.
263 See, e.g., Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043; Spar, 156 U.S. at 102-03.
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roles of the judge and jury.264 The Founders were not worried about the jury
subverting the citizens' rights; rather, the Founders realized the necessity of the
jury to protect the citizens from governmental abuses. 265 Nevertheless, judges in
this era declared that it was they who could most impartially mete out justice,
often adopting a paternalistic tone. According to Justice Curtis in his opinion in
Morris, "[W]hen a law, unpopular in some locality, is to be enforced there, then
comes the strain upon the administration of justice; and few unprejudiced men
would hesitate as to where that strain would be most firmly borne. 266 Appar-
ently, Justice Curtis and the other judges who adopted this line of reasoning did
not grasp the irony that they were proclaiming judge impartiality while simulta-
neously making a decision that directly increased their own power at the ex-
pense of that of the jury.
Another argument put forth by judges denying the jury's right to decide
issues of law was the potential for a lack of uniformity in the laws if each jury
were empowered to independently interpret the law.267 Undoubtedly, uniformity
in the laws is a worthy aspiration; however, allowing lower court judges to in-
terpret the laws and rule on the constitutionality of laws also leads to a lack of
uniformity throughout the country.268 Even though the Supreme Court may
have appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under federal laws or the Constitu-
tion, Congress also has the power to provide exceptions to this jurisdiction, and
indeed there was no avenue for Supreme Court review of the Callender case
itself.269 The structure of state judicial systems, such as Massachusetts in which
there were multiple judges each rendering their own interpretation of the law,
also undercuts the proposition that historically judges were in a better position
to provide uniformity to the legal system.27° More generally, the Founders con-
ceived of a jury that would be an active participant in the administration of jus-
tice, and the trial itself would be used as a means of teaching the jury about the
law and the citizens' rights.271 Under this theory, once a jury became educated
in a particular area of law and received guidance from the judge, the jury should
be equipped to make a sound interpretation of the law. Even though jury service
is an infrequent event for any one juror, one could hope that juries could reach
determinations that were nearly as uniform as those of judges, since judges
would help educate the jurors on the law. Such a concept might seem foreign to
the modern reader, but perhaps that is only because the decisions made by legis-
264 See Changing Role, supra note 10, at 172 (describing the Founders' conception of the role
of the jury as protector against government oppression).
265 See id.
266 Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1336.
267 See, e.g., Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043; Callender, 25 F. Cas. at 256-57.
268 See AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 101-02.
269 Id. at 101.
270 See NELSON, supra note 135, at 28-30.
271 See supra Part Ifl.A-B.
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latures and judges curtailing the power of the jury have also largely eliminated
the education aspect of the judicial system.
In addition to the aforementioned reasons used by judges to deny the
jury's right to decide issues of law, judges who have denied the right to jury
review have pointed to the Constitution and the structure of the national gov-
ernment to infer that the right to decide the constitutionality of laws was to be
vested solely in judges.272 In support of this claim, judges looked to the fact that
federal judges must swear an oath to uphold the Constitution, whereas the Con-
stitution puts no such requirement upon jurors.273 Furthermore, judges noted
that both the sheer importance of such decisions and the potential to negate leg-
islative acts dictate that neither the Constitution nor the Judiciary Act should be
construed to give such an important right to juries, but rather to officers of the
judicial branch.274 It is striking that none of these arguments address which part
of the Constitution demands that judges decide the constitutionality of laws over
other federal officials who take an oath to uphold the Constitution, perhaps be-
cause there is no such evidence.275 Instead, the arguments seem to rest on a
more basic premise that because deciding the constitutionality of laws is impor-
tant to the functioning of the country, the drafters of the Constitution and Con-
gress certainly would not have left such a power in the hands of the jury. Again,
this premise fails to acknowledge that the Founders conceived of a jury as a
vital part of the democratic process, and arguably similar to a lower branch of a
bicameral judiciary.276 If viewed in this manner, both the judge and jury should
be able to act as a check on the legislative branch when it passes an unconstitu-
tional law.277 Given that the Founders viewed the jury as a protector against
governmental overreaching, it follows that the jury should not only have a role
in protecting citizens from an incorrect interpretation of the law, but perhaps
even more importantly from an unconstitutional law itself.
Legal scholars have chronicled the demise of the jury's right to decide
questions of law; however, instead of analyzing whether this demise was war-
ranted given that such a practice was commonplace at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution and was arguably a part of the Founders' conception of the
jury, scholars have instead focused on the practical circumstances that brought
272 See Callender, 25 F. Cas. at 256-57; United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1331-33
(C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
273 Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1333.
274 See Calender, 25 F. Cas. at 255-56.
275 See AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 99.
276 See supra Part IH.A-B; see also 3 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 71 (H.A. Washington ed., 1861) (writing that trial by jury is "the only anchor ... by
which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.").
277 See AMAR's BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 93.
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about the change.278 Moreover, rather than question the propriety of the demise
of the right, scholars seem to suggest that it was an inevitable result of the matu-
ration of American society. 279 According to scholars, one of the factors that
initially contributed to colonial juries deciding issues of law was that judges had
little formal legal training and the written law was not readily available.280 As
the nineteenth century progressed, the legal profession became more profession-
alized and the law became more complicated, and thus there was less desire for
juries to decide questions of law.281 Simultaneously, the distrust of judges pre-
sumably waned in the nineteenth century, lessening the need for juries to protect
the citizens from judicial abuses.282
While the aforementioned theory provides a practical explanation for
why the jury's right to decide issues of law declined in the nineteenth century, it
implicitly assumes that the distribution of authority in the early courts was a
result of convenience or happenstance, rather than a deliberate choice to give the
jury the right to decide issues of law. History shows that Founders with as dis-
parate beliefs as Hamilton and Jefferson acknowledged that the jury's right to
decide issues of law was tied to its functions as a protector against governmental
oppression; 283 to suggest that the jury's right to decide issues of law had no rela-
tionship to the Founders' broader conception of the jury is simply a mistake.
Even if legal concepts became more complicated in the nineteenth century, that
circumstance alone should not preclude a jury from hearing a case. The Foun-
ders did not envision a courtroom in which the jury would listen to evidence and
make legal determinations on their own; instead, the judge was to play an inte-
gral role in educating the jurors on the law and providing them with the tools to
render informed verdicts.2 4
Furthermore, the aforementioned theory relied on the fact that citizens
were less distrusting of judges in the late nineteenth century than at the time of
the Founding. Even if that fact is accepted as true, it does not negate the fact
that the Founders thought the jury to be such a vital institution because of its
ability to act as a check on governmental power. Just because the public opin-
ion of judicial officers was generally higher in the late nineteenth century does
278 See, e.g., Howe, supra note 24, at 614-16; Brief History, supra note 5, at 915-20; Pepper,
supra note 21, at 639-40; Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 408; Harrington, supra note 55, at 435-
36.
279 See Brief History, supra note 5, at 917 (suggesting that the increase in the technical nature
of the law, more extensive commercial transactions, and increase in efficiency in democratic
lawmaking in the nineteenth century may have accounted for a decrease in the need for juries to
decide issues of law).
280 See Harrington, supra note 55, at 378-79; Brief History, supra note 5, at 917.
281 See Brief History, supra note 5, at 915-17; Pepper, supra note 21, at 639-40.
282 Pepper, supra note 21, at 639-40.
283 See supra Part II.B.
284 See supra Part UI.B (analogizing the role of the jury to a lower branch in a bicameral judici-
ary, with the judge informing the jury of the pertinent law on the subject).
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not mean that there were no longer any biased judges on the bench.285 Indeed,
the Founders did not necessarily think that the majority of judges were prone to
abuses of power; instead, they wanted the jury to have the right to decide issues
of law to protect against the decision of a rogue judge.286
Another predominant theory espoused by scholars is that the narrowing
of the role of the jury, including the right to decide issues of law, was due in
large part to the drastic change in the composition of the jury pool. 287 Under
this theory, as the jury pool became more diverse and inclusive, the beliefs held
by the jury members likewise became more heterogeneous, and consequently
the verdicts became less uniform.288 As popular faith in the jury declined, the
289judge interceded to provide uniformity and continuity.
While on its face this theory may go far in explaining the demise of the
right of the jury to decide issues of law, it raises many more questions about the
impact of race, gender, and socioeconomic status on the narrowing of jury's
rights. 290 An in-depth discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle,29' but the resolution of any of these issues is not relevant to whether the
narrowing of the jury's right to decide issues of law comports with the Foun-
ders' conception of the jury. The Founders thought of the jury as a majoritarian
institution-an arm of the popular government.292 That the jury pool was be-
coming more "diverse" only meant that it was a more accurate representation of
the people. While it is understandable that judges might want to limit the ability
of the jury to use its power to subvert unpopular legislation,293 to wholly take
away the jury's right to decide issues of law strips them of the power needed to
neutralize equally oppressive judicial action.
Scholars have paid considerably less attention to analyzing the denial of
the right to jury review in the nineteenth century, perhaps because courts rarely
acknowledged the right to jury review in the first instance. Nevertheless, some
scholars have argued that the need for the jury to decide the constitutionality of
laws diminished once a truly democratic legislature was in place to ensure that
only constitutional statutes were enacted. 294 This explanation is flawed, how-
285 In fact, one could argue that the judges who made decisions enlarging their own control over
verdicts at the expense of juries were precisely the kind of biased judges of which the Founders
were concerned.
286 See supra Part III.B.
287 See Brief History, supra note 5, at 916; Changing Role, supra note 10, at 191-92; Pepper,
supra note 21, at 640; Harrington, supra note 55, at 435-36.
288 See Harrington, supra note 55, at 435-37; Brief History, supra note 5, at 916.
289 See Changing Role, supra note 10, at 191-92, Harrington, supra note 55, at 437.
290 See generally Brief History, supra note 5, at 876-901 (describing the changing composition
of the jury).
291 For more information about this topic, see generally id. at 876-901.
292 See supra Part III.A.
293 See AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 103.
294 Howe, supra note 24, at 615-16.
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ever, for it does not account for why judges still have the power to decide the
constitutionality of laws; if a democratic legislature could be trusted to always
pass constitutional laws, judicial review would also be unnecessary.
In a related vein, some scholars have theorized that the jury's right to
decide issues of law and the constitutionality of laws is part of the "recurring
cycle of rejection and return to law. 295 Roscoe Pound asserted that there are
moments in history when "more or less reversion to justice without law be-
comes necessary in order to bring the administration of justice into touch with
new moral ideas or changed social or political conditions. 296 During this rever-
sion, new legal rules are developed, and over time the rudimentary forms of
justice are replaced by more uniform judicial action that is governed by the new
rules.297 It has been argued that late colonial America was one such revolution-
ary moment in which there arose a belief that the common man, through his
service on the jury, was able to understand legal and constitutional principles
29
and apply them to administer justice.  Once the growth in the body of law was
complete, more specific legal rules developed, and the need for the jury to de-
cide issues of law diminished.299
The "recurring cycle" theory raises the point that there may be times
when the traditional methods for administering justice will not be sufficient to
meet the growing needs of society. However, it would be difficult, if not impos-
sible, to predict when such a revolutionary moment will occur, and thus the "re-
curring cycle" theory might warrant the recognition of the right to jury review
so that the jury can send a signal to the other branches that constitutional reform
is needed.3° In fact, it could be argued that the right of the jury to decide the
constitutionality of laws is more important than the right to decide issues of law
that do not have constitutional implications, because of the need to act in the
face of such a revolutionary moment. Indeed, an examination of the types of
cases in which the right of the jury to decide the constitutionality of laws was
implicated (for example, the Alien and Sedition Act3°land the Fugitive Slave
Act 30 2) lends support to the idea that such cases were potentially revolutionary
moments in which the jury needed to have such a right.
Neither the judicial opinions denying the jury's right to decide questions
of law nor the scholars' analysis of the phenomenon fully considered how that
right fit in with the Founders' conception of the jury. According to the Foun-
295 Brief History, supra note 5, at 918.
296 Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 696, 699 (1913).
297 See id. at 696-706; Harrington, supra note 55, at 438-39; Brief History, supra note 5, at
918-20.
298 Harrington, supra note 55, at 439.
299 Id. at 439-40.
300 See Magliocca, supra note 22, at 216.
301 See United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800).
302 See United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
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ders, the rights of the jury to decide questions of law and the constitutionality of
laws formed an essential part of the jury's arsenal to combat governmental op-
pression and provided it with the tools to be a central figure in the administra-
tion of justice and democracy as a whole. Limitations of these rights-whether
in the name of uniformity in the interpretation of laws, the greater expertise of
the judiciary, or the protection of citizens against potential unjust actions by
juries-are not in accordance with the Founders' conception of the jury at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and thus they are
arguably unconstitutional under Article 1H and the Sixth and Seventh Amend-
ments as a deprivation of the right to trial by jury.
40
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